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THE IMPLICATIONS OF INSTITUTIONAL SPECIFICITIES ON 
THE INCOME INEQUALITIES DRIVERS IN EUROPEAN UNION 
 
Abstract.This paper aims to review the different impacts of income 
inequality drivers on the Gini coefficient, depending on institutional specificities. 
In this context, we divided the European Union member states in two clusters (the 
cluster of member states with inclusive institutions / extractive institutions) using 
the institutional pillar as a clustering criterion. In both cases, we assesed the 
impact of income inequality drivers on Gini coefficient by using a fixed effects 
model in order to examine the role and importance of the institutions in the 
dynamics of income disparities.The models were estimated by applying the Panel 
Estimated Generalized Least Squares (EGLS) method, this being weighted by 
Cross-section weights option. The separate assessment of the income inequality 
reactivity to the change in its determinants according to the institutional criterion 
represents a new approach in this field of research and the results show that the 
impact of moderating income inequality strategies is limitedin the case of member 
states with extractive institutions. 
Keywords: income inequality, poverty, institutions, cluster, neets. 
JEL classification: D63, E02, I32 
1. Introduction 
 Inequality still continues to represent a global issue in its various forms: 
payment, income, wealth, gender, opportunity. This paper focuses on the review of 
the income inequality in EU member states and on the examination of its drivers, 
since the economic and financial crisis has increased the social challenges for 
European citizens. In particular, this phenomenon has been covered from 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ion Dobre, Ionuț Jianu, Alexandru Bodislav, Carmen Rădulescu, Sorin Burlacu 
__________________________________________________________________ 
60 
 
DOI: 10.24818/18423264/53.2.19.04 
 
economic, social and institutional perspective. Nevertheless, empirical evidence 
proved to be more robust in terms of the implications of economic and social 
developments on the dynamics of income inequalities. 
 This paper aims to complete the economic literature in the field by setting 
up an analysis framework for the member states of the European Union to facilitate 
the comparison of the impact differences of  income inequality drivers on this 
phenomenon, depending on the institutional specificities. 
 The main motivation for selecting this theme is based both on the actuality 
of this phenomenon and on the insufficient coverage of the institutions impact on 
the dynamics of the income inequality in the relevant published literature. 
 Moreover, from the institutional perspective, it is more relevant to capture 
the results of the institutions and not just the inputs. Also, the negative externalities 
of the capitalism on inequality phenomenom are one of the main reasons for which 
the economic system may fail on long run. 
 The objective of this research is to determine the implications of 
institutional specificities on the impact exercised by the drivers of income 
inequality, its achievement depending on the following specific objectives: 
 clustering the European Union member states according to the institutional 
criteria published by the World Economic Forum in two groups of 
countries: member states with inclusive institutions and member states with 
extractive institutions; 
 estimating the impact of the income inequality drivers on the Gini 
coefficient for each cluster defined previously; 
 comparing the impact differences resulted from the models estimated.  
 This research is structured as follows: 
1. second section: the main results of the relevant published literature in this 
field;  
2. third section: the methodology used for achieving the research objective;  
3. fourth section: results and interpretation;  
4. fifth section: conclusions and recommendations.  
 Finally, this research will provide recommendations for policy 
intervention, depending on the differences between the impact of the income 
inequality drivers associated to each model. 
 
2. Literature review 
 Research results in this area provide both robust and uncertain evidence, 
depending on the indicators used in the assessment. Regarding the evolution of the 
inequality phenomenon, the International Monetary Fund (2017) proved that in the 
last 30 years, 53% of countries experienced an increase in income inequality 
(catched by Gini coefficient) by at least two deviation points. This indicator is also 
the most relevant measure for the level of income inequality, its methodology 
being made available by Gini (1912). 
 Even if the recent published literature has provided evidence to facilitate 
the inclusion of other factors (globalisation, low immigration, automation / 
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technological progress) on the income inequality drivers list, some economists 
believe that theinstitutional arrangements influencing the distribution of economic 
growth benefits among the population, may cause changes in the dynamics of 
income gap (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2002; Stiglitz et al., 2009). 
 Chong and Gradstein (2007) estimated the impact of institutional quality 
on income inequality using a Panel window and found that improving the quality 
of institutions is associated with reducing income inequality between income and 
vice versa. Other authors have pointed out that inequalities do not arise as a result 
of the natural forces of the markets and are a consequence of the institutions 
through which those has been established (Clark and Kavanagh, 1996).  
 Kaplan and Raugh (2013) see increasing inequality as a phenomenon that 
depends on the marginal labour productivity, technological progress or the 
differences between non-market mechanisms that allow political and economic 
elites to extract excess rents, which damages the overall economic system through 
manipulation, corporate governance, social norms, respectively the tax and 
regulatory system. Moreover, the income gap is also determined by the political 
process, when the economic agents succeed to obtain favors from political 
decision-makers (subsidies, regulations or preferential laws).  
 However, the published literature is not broad enough and further evidence 
is needed to fully address the relationship between quality of institutions and 
income inequality, which strengthens the motivation of choosing this research area. 
This paper does not aim to follow the same methodology used by the authors 
willing to estimate the impact of the quality of institutions on income inequality. Its 
objective is to identify the specificities of the determinants of the income 
inequality, depending on the institutional characteristics. In order to cover the 
relevant theoretical framework, it is also essential to highlight the empirical 
evidence on the sign of the control variables coefficients. 
 Engerman and Sokolof (2002) argued that the main determinants of income 
inequality developed in colonial regimes are the historical factors. Niehues (2010) 
provided additional evidence to confirm the strong link between Gini's historical 
values and the current level of the indicator. Following the use of the Panel GMM 
method, with a robust specification of instruments, the author has demonstrated 
that the increase in the Gini lagged by one year leads to an increase in the current 
inequality with about 65% of the change, this being the highest impact exerted by 
the exogenous variables on its dynamics. Also, the impact of the autoregressive 
term has been found to be significant at a 1% significance threshold. 
 Theoretically, in an economy, extreme inequality may coexist with a 
minimum level of poverty and vice versa, but in practice this phenomenon is not 
frequent as these indicators are statistics calculated on the basis of the same 
household income distribution, which creates a mechanical link between them. 
Lynch et al. (2000) provided the reason for the high correlation between inequality 
and poverty, highlighting the fact that societies that prefer inequality are those who 
are not dedicated to poverty reduction. The authors pointed out that social norms 
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and values that make it possible to deepen economic inequality also facilitate the 
rise of poverty. 
 Dabla-Norris et al. (2015) indicated that the low quality of the educational 
system and the asymmetry of educational competencies are among the most 
important determinants of inequality in advanced countries. Ward et al. (2009) 
examined the relationship between unemployment and income inequality and 
found that a positive shock on unemployment rate leads to a deepen of income 
inequality.  
 Regarding the analysis of the relationship between social spending and 
income inequality, Niehus (2010) found that increasing social spending leads to a 
reduction in income disparities. This effect has been also confirmed by Fuest et al. 
(2010).  
 Some economists have also focused on studying the relationship between 
access to credit and income inequality, and have shown that high borrowing costs 
make it difficult for people at risk of poverty to access loans (Perotti, 1996). Thus, 
this instrument loses one of its main integrative function: facilitating the access of 
low-income people to education. The positive effect of private sector credit (% of 
GDP) on the dynamics of the Gini coefficient was also confirmed by Jaumotte et 
al. (2008).  
 
3. Methodology 
 In this section, we described the methodology used to identify the role of 
institutions in the dynamics of income inequality recorded in the European Union 
member states. This paper starts from the hypothesis used by Acemoglu and 
Robinson (2012), according to which the quality of the institutions is a relevant 
determinant of the level of prosperity or poverty / inequality. The authors associate 
the extractive institutions with high poverty rates and the inclusive institutions with 
low poverty rates. 
 Firstly, we looked for the main indicators that can be used as a proxy for 
the quality of institutions. The identification of such an indicator may be 
methodologically sensitive, as the main statistical sources, organizations or 
institutions that publish such data are built on the surveys basis. Therefore, it 
should be pointed out that such indicators assess the target audience's perception on 
the purpose of the survey. In this context, we chose to use an indicator reflecting 
more the perception on the results of the institutions (outputs) and not the inputs, 
this approach having the role to catch better the efficiency of government in several 
areas. More specifically, we used the scores of the institutions pillar published by 
the World Economic Forum in the Global Competitiveness Report 2017-2018 for 
the European Union member states - the data from this publication are the values 
reported for 2016. The limits set by the organisation for this indicator are 1 
(minimum score reflecting the lowest quality of institutions) and 7 (maximum 
score reflecting the highest quality of institutions). 
 In order to ensure the feasibility of the comparison between European 
Union member states in various institutional areas, we have used the sub-indices of 
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the institutional pillar published by the World Economic Forum as follows (Table 
1): 
 All sub-indices are numerically represented on a scale of 1-7, according to 
the main indicator of institutions quality, with the exception of the sub-indicator 
no. 21 which is numerically represented on a scale of 1-10 (where 1 reflects a 
minimum quality of the institution and 10 reflects a maximum quality of the 
institution). 
 
Table 1. Structure of the institutions pillar 
Institutions pillar 
1. Property rights 
7. Favoritism in decisions 
of government officials 
13. Business costs of 
terrorism 19. Efficacy of 
corporate boards 2. Intellectual property 
protection  
8. Efficiency of 
government spending 
14. Business costs of 
crime and violence 
3. Diversion of public funds 
9. Burden of government 
regulation 
15. Organized crime 
20. Protection of 
minority shareholders 
interests 4. Public trust in politicians 
10. Efficiency of legal 
framework in setting 
disputes 
16. Reliability of police 
services 
5. Irregular payments and 
bribes 
11. Efficiency of legal 
framework in challenging 
regulations 
17. Ethical behaviour 
of firms 21. Strength of investor 
protection 
6. Judicial independence 
12. Transparency of 
government policymaking 
18. Strength of auditing 
and reporting standards 
Source:Own processings using World Economic Forum data, The Global 
Competitiveness Report 2017-2018 
 Estimating the impact of institutional quality on income inequality may be 
subjected to uncertainty given that the institutional pillar methodology reflects 
more the Institution's perceptions of the Forum. In this context, we preferred to use 
this indicator as a clustering criterion and not as a potential explanatory factor of 
income inequality, which facilitates the separation of member states in two 
clusters, depending on the national quality of institutions: the cluster of member 
states with inclusive institutions and the cluster of member states with extractive 
institutions. The categorisation of states in the clusters above-mentioned was made 
using the median of the institutions scores reported for each EU Member States. 
The use of the median provided the possibility to construct two clusters with an 
equal number of countries, which creates the premises for a more relevant 
comparison between these two groups of states. In this context, we included the 
member states with institutions scores above 4.29 in the cluster of member states 
with inclusive institutions, while the member states recording scores below the 
median were placed in the group of countries with extractive institutions. Although 
Brexit started to become a reality, this research focuses on the European Union 
with 28 member states for ensuring the similarity of observations between clusters. 
 Subsequently, we estimated the impact of the explanatory factors of 
income inequality on the Gini coefficient for each cluster, and finally we compared 
the impact differences between the estimated models to highlight the specificities 
of each institutional cluster. For this purpose, we used annual data for 2010-2016 
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period, given that the variables extracted from Eurostat and World Bank do not 
cover a large period of analysis for all countries analysed. Since 2016 corresponds 
to the clustering criterion used, this became the upper limit of the time period 
analysed. The structure of the clusters and data required the use of panel data for 
both group of countries, each model including 14 cross-sections (EU member 
states) and 7 cross-section observations - a total of 98 observations per model 
(inclusive / extractive). 
 Further, we checked the stationarity for the data used  by "Summary" 
window which provides a detailed view of the results of five stationarity tests and 
we concluded that is essential to use a method close to the autoregressive 
distributed lag since the variables proved to be stationary at level and first 
difference: 
 Assuming common unit root process (null hypothesis: unit root / alternative: 
no unit root): 
 Levin, Lin & Chu t* (applied in the following assumptions: trend and 
constant, constant, absence of trend and constant) - 3 results - some 
disadvantages of the test are: (a) if the number of observations per cross-
section is small, the power of the test may be questionable; (b) this test 
ignores the possibility of the cross-section dependence.  
 Breitung t-stat - (applied if the test equation include the trend and 
constant) - 1 result - this test differs from Levin, Lin & Chu t* since only 
the autoregressive portion (and not the exogenous components) is 
removed when constructing the standardized proxies.   
 Assuming individual unit root process (null hypothesis: unit root / 
alternative: some cross-sections without unit root): 
 Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat (applied in the following assumptions: trend 
and constant, constant) - 2 results - this test works better with low number 
of observations per cross-section than Breitung and have little power 
when trend is included in the analysis; 
 ADF - Fisher Chi-square (applied in the following assumptions: trend and 
constant, constant, absence of trend and constant) - 3 results - this test 
allow each cross-section to have different lag length; 
 PP - Fisher Chi-square (applied in the following assumptions: trend and 
constant, constant, absence of trend and constant) - 3 results.  
 However, the reduced number of observations per cross-section made it 
necessary to set the maximum lag limit to 1 year and to select the gap between 
cause and effect according to the empirical evidence. 
 Also, in case of panel analyses, it is necessary to identify the optimal 
method of capturing the effects within the model: random effects model or fixed 
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effects model. In this context, we used the Redundant Fixed Effects - Likelihood 
Ratio test which indicated the use of a fixed-effect model that takes into account 
the cross-section heterogeneity. Considering the above-mentioned aspects, we 
started by estimating the following equation: 
 
𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑖(−1)𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼2𝑝𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 +  𝛼3𝑛𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒(−1)𝑖𝑡 +
𝛼4𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼5𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑏𝑖𝑡 + 𝜃𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡(1) 
where: 
 i = number of countries andt = time period; 
 𝜀𝑡  = error term = 𝜌𝑖  (constant across individuals) + 𝜃𝑖𝑡  (composite error 
term); 
 𝛼0  = the coefficient of the intercept and𝛼0−5  = the coefficients of the 
exogenous variables; 
 gini = Gini coefficient (on a scale of 1 to 100) - Eurostat; 
 poverty = people at risk of poverty rate after social transfers (the share of 
population earning leass than 60% of the median equivalised national 
income) - Eurostat;  
 neetsrate = rate of young people neither in employment nor in education 
and training (the share of population aged 15-24 years neither in 
employment, or did not received any education or training in the four 
weeks preceding the survey - Eurostat; 
 social = social expenditures of general government (% of GDP) - Eurostat; 
 creditb = the share of private sector credit of banking sector in GDP - 
World Bank. 
gini = 1 - ∑ [
𝑛
𝑖=1
the percentage of the population income of national equivalent 
income +(the share of population in total population + 2 * the share of population 
that is richer than the population under review)](2)                               
 In order to apply the fixed effects model, we have added 13 dummy 
variables in equation (1) these representing the individual intercept for each cross-
section (minus one). Therefore, we computed the Least-Squares Dummy Variables 
(LSDV) estimators for each model as follows:  
 
𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑖(−1)𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑝𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽3𝑛𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒(−1)𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽4𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑏𝑖𝑡 + 𝑜1𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦1 + 𝑜2𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦2 + 𝑜3𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦3 +
 𝑜4𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦4 +  𝑜5𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦5 +  … 𝑜13𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦13 + 𝜀𝑡                             (3) 
  
where: 
 𝛽1−5are the LSDV estimators; 
 𝑜1−13 + 𝛽0 = the intercept for each cross-section; 
 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 = a binary variable for each cross-section, excepting the last one; 
 the undefined variables was described in equation (1).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ion Dobre, Ionuț Jianu, Alexandru Bodislav, Carmen Rădulescu, Sorin Burlacu 
__________________________________________________________________ 
66 
 
DOI: 10.24818/18423264/53.2.19.04 
 
 
However, dummy variables inluced in equation (3) may affect the consistency of 
the estimators. In this respect, we solved this issue by estimating the following 
equation, expressing the variables in means terms: 
𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑖
𝑖𝑡
= 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑖(−1)𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼2𝑝𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 +  𝛼3𝑛𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒(−1)𝑖𝑡 +
𝛼4𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼5𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑏𝑖𝑡 +  𝜃𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡                                                                     (4) 
 
Next, we substracted the equation (4) from equation (1):  
 
𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑡 − 𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑡 = (𝛼0 − 𝛼0) + 𝛼1(𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑖(−1)𝑖𝑡 − 𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑖(−1)𝑖𝑡) + 𝛼2(𝑝𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 −
𝑝𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡) + 𝛼3(𝑛𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒(−1)𝑖𝑡 − 𝑛𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒(−1)𝑖𝑡) + 𝛼4(𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡 −
𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡) + 𝛼5(𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑏𝑖𝑡 − 𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑏𝑖𝑡) + (𝜃𝑖𝑡 −  𝜃𝑖𝑡) + (𝜀𝑡 − 𝜀𝑡)                       (5) 
 
orthe final form of the fixed effects model: 
 
𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑡 − 𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼1(𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑖(−1)𝑖𝑡 − 𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑖(−1)𝑖𝑡) +  𝛼2(𝑝𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 − 𝑝𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡) +
 𝛼3(𝑛𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒(−1)𝑖𝑡 − 𝑛𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒(−1)𝑖𝑡) + 𝛼4(𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡 − 𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡) +
𝛼5(𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑏𝑖𝑡 − 𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑏𝑖𝑡) + 𝜀𝑡
∗                                                                          (6) 
 
where 𝜀𝑡
∗ is the pure error from the equation. 
 Further, we have applied Cross-section weights option and White cross-
section covariance estimation method - a method known also as Feasible 
Generalized Least Squares. Using cross-section weights for both models was 
intended to allow the existence of heteroscedasticity in low dimensions, if it exists. 
Other options for ex-ante correction of the heteroskedasticity (Cross-section SUR 
or Period SUR) were not available due to the small number of observations and the 
method applied (fixed effects model). 
 Following the inclusion in the analysis of the 1st-order autoregressive term 
and of the NEETs rate lagged by 1-year, a number of 84 observations out of 98 
possible has resulted. After estimating the models, we have tested the main 
assumptions needed to validate the maximum verisimilitude of the estimators, as 
follows: (i) linearity of the model; (ii) model validity - Fisher test; (iii) normal 
distribution of the residuals - Jarque-Bera test; (iv) absence of heteroskedasticity - 
Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey test; (v) absence of cross-section dependence - Breusch-
Pagan, Pesaran CD and Pesaran scaled LM; (vi) absence of autocorrelation of 
residuals - Breusch-Pagan test; (vii) absence of multicollinearity - Klein's criterion 
(verification by calculating the Pearson statistical correlation). 
 The verification of the absence of autocorrelation of residues and 
heteroscedasticity was performed by estimating the probability associated with the 
above-mentioned tests. In order to confirm the absence of heteroskedasticity, we 
 
 
 
 
 
The Implications of Institutional Specificities on the Income Inequalities Drivers in 
European Union 
___________________________________________________________________ 
67 
 
DOI: 10.24818/18423264/53.2.19.04 
 
estimated the probability associated with the Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey test, 
depending on the coefficient of determination of the following equation: 
𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙^2𝑖𝑡 = γ0 + δ0𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑖(−1)𝑖𝑡 +  δ1𝑝𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 + δ2𝑛𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒(−1)𝑖𝑡 +
δ3𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡 + δ4𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑏𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡(7) 
where𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙^2 = the square of the standardized residuals from equation (1), 
γ0 is the coefficient of the constant term, δ0−4 are the coefficients of the 
independent variables and𝜀𝑡  is the error term.  
 Then, we computed the probability of the Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey test 
using chisq.dist.rt function (excel), based on the product of the number of 
observations (n) of equation (7) and the R-squared, respectively the degrees of 
freedom (df) which correspond to the number of independent variables except for 
the constant. 
 Next, in order to verify the absence of autocorrelation of residuals, we 
estimated the following equation: 
𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡 = 𝜆0 + 𝜇0𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑖(−1)𝑖𝑡 + 𝜇1𝑝𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝜇2𝑛𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒(−1)𝑖𝑡 +
 𝜇3𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡 + 𝜇4𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑏𝑖𝑡 + 𝜇5𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙(−1)𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡(8)  
where 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙  = the standardized residuals from equation (1), 
𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙(−1)represents the residuals lagged by 1 year, 𝜆0is the coefficient of the 
constant term, 𝜇0−5are the coefficients of the exogenous variables and𝜀𝑡is the error 
term. Finally, in order to calculate the probability of the Breusch-Pagan test, we 
followed the same methodology as described above, excepting that in this case we 
set the number of degrees of freedom to be equal with the number of lags used for 
the residuals. 
 
4. Results and interpretation 
 In this section we analysed the research results, focusing on identifying the 
relationship between the quality of institutions and the level of income inequality. 
In this context, we divided the European Union in two groups of countries, 
depending on the score of the institutional pillar, published by the World Economic 
Forum: the cluster of member states with inclusive institutions / extractive 
institutions. Figure 1 highlights the institutional specificities of the member states 
and demonstrates that the structure of the clusters is in line with their level of 
development. The inclusive institutions cluster is composed by the Northern and 
Anglo-saxon countries. 
The exceptions are EE, MT and PT, whom even if are a part of the 
catching-up and the Southern submodel of development, these are also categorised 
in the cluster of member states with inclusive institutions. Regarding the group of 
countries with extractive institutions, it is composed by the catching-up and the 
Southern submodel, excepting the cases above-mentioned. Moreover, it can be 
clearly seen that the structure of the institutional clusters depends on the 
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geographic location, since the Southern Europe (excepting PT) and Eastern Europe 
constitute the extractive institutions cluster and the Northern Europe (excepting LV 
and LT) and Western Europe form the inclusive institutions cluster. As regards the 
relationship between the evolution of the institutions score and the dynamic of the 
Gini coefficient in the EU-28 member states we computed the Pearson statistical 
correlation.The result show that there is a negative correlation between their 
evolution (-37.63%), which determines, preliminarily, the possibility of an inverse 
relationship between the quality of institutions and Gini coefficient. Following the 
use of the sub-indices of the institutions pillar as a clustering criterion, both 
institutional clusters retained a large part of their structure (Figure 2). 
Figure 1. The main institutional cluster of EU member states 
Source: Own processings on mapchart.net, using World Economic Forum data, 
The Global Competitiveness Report 2017-2018 
 However, when we used the institutions sub-indices as a clustering 
criterion, few countries remained in the same cluster as the main one: AT, EL, PL, 
RO, SE. In addition, FI and EE are the countries that are a part of the cluster of 
member states with inclusive institutions for all sub-indices reviewed, excepting 
the criteria related to strength of investor protection. At the opposite end were IT 
and HU, those being categorised in the group of states with inclusive institutions 
only when using the clustering criterion based on the sub-indices related to the 
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strength of investor protection and the business costs of crime and violence. Other 
countries have a good institutional position, but have weak positions in terms of the 
sub-indices associated with security challenges (FR and DE): business costs of 
crime and violence, organized crime. 
The structure of the clusters designed by using the sub-indices as a 
clustering criteria has proved to be identical with the structure of the main clusters 
only in the case of four sub-pillars: property rights, public trust in politicians, 
diversion of public funds, ethical behavior of firms. 
 
Figure 2. Institutional clustering of EU member states in detail 
Source: Own processings using World Economic Forum data, The Global 
Competitiveness Report 2017-2018 
 Next, we estimated the impact of the income inequality drivers on the Gini 
coefficient for each group of countries, which facilitates the comparison of impact 
differences between them. In order to select the most appropriate estimation 
method, firstly, we checked the stationarity of the data. 
Table 2 indicates the stationarity of the data at level and at the first 
difference for both clusters. The optimal lag has been chosen by using Schwarz 
information criterion, while the final result of the test for each variable has been 
decided depending on the share of the number of tests confirming stationarity in 
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the total number of tests (12). Only three variables proved to be stationary at level: 
creditb *, gini (-1) ** and social **; the rest of the variables becoming stationary 
following the processing of the first difference. These results indicated the use of a 
autoregressive distributed lag model, but the lag selection was limited by the small 
number of observations. 
Table 2. Stationarity of the data 
Stationarity  
(Schwarz criterion) 
Variable 
Number of tests confirming 
stationarity at I(0) 
Number of tests 
confirming stationarity 
at I(1) 
Inclusive 
institutions model* 
gini 3 of  12 10 of 12 
gini(-1) 3 of  12 10 of 12 
poverty 5 of 12 9 of 12 
neetsrate(-1) 5 of 12 9 of 12 
social 2 of 12 9 of 12 
creditb 7 of 12 Stationary at I(0) 
Extractive 
institutions model** 
gini 4 of 12 11 of 12 
gini(-1) 7 of 12 Stationary at I(0) 
poverty 4 of 12 11 of 12 
neetsrate(-1) 5 of 12 
6 of 6 - I(2) test is 
forbidden 
social 7 of 12 Stationary at I(0) 
creditb 5 of 12 7 of 12 
Source: Own calculations using Eviews 9.0 
 Further, we applied the EGLS method mentioned in the methodology, 
which returned the results displayed in Figure 3. This method was strengthen by 
the use of a fixed-effect model, taking into account the result of the Redundant 
Fixed Effects -Likelihood Ratio test (0%), which indicated its use (Table 3). 
 The impact of historical income inequality on the current one.The 
estimation shows that an increase in the Gini coefficient lagged by 1 year with 1 
point deviation leads to a rise in the current value of the Gini coefficient by 0.143 
deviation points in the case of the cluster of member states with inclusive 
institutions and by 0.153 deviation points for the group of countries with extractive 
institutions. The higher impact estimated in the case of the extractive institutions 
cluster shows that the current income inequalities are more vulnerable to the 
historical levels of it. In this context, income inequality become more difficult to be 
controlled due to the existence of extractive institutions that facilitate the increase 
of income inequality. The sign of the coefficient can be explained by the fact that 
the population uses its past savings to generate additional income in present or by 
the higher capital yield than the income yield.  
The impact of the poverty rate on income inequality.According to the 
results reported by the inclusive institutions model, an increase in the people at risk 
of poverty rate by 1pp leads to a change of Gini coefficient by 0.481 deviation 
points, this being lower than the one reported by the group of countries with 
extractive institutions (0.512 deviation points). 
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Figure 3. Estimation results 
Source: Own calculations using Eviews9.0 
 
Even if, theoretically, poverty can be associated with a low level of 
inequality between household incomes, in practice the impact of the people at risk 
of poverty rate on Gini is positive, especially in the case of the EU economy. When 
a larger share of the population are recording income falls,  reaching a lower 
income level than the poverty line and the population of the last quartile / quintile / 
decile begins to record an increasing trend of the income share in the national 
equivalent income, the corresponding scores of the first quartile / quintiles / decile 
reach low levels, which leads to a lower total score, respectively to a higher Gini 
coefficient. For a better view of the relationship, the examination of the Gini 
coefficient formula (methodology - equation 2) is essential.  
Moreover, poverty and income inequality are also linked through the 
common set of social policy instruments, the relationship with unemployment or 
economic growth. The reason why the impact of the increase in the poverty rate on 
the increase in income inequality is higher in the case of countries with extractive 
institutions is that, in this group of countries, the rates of people at risk of poverty 
are higher than the ones recorded by the member states with inclusive institutions. 
The impact of the rate of young people neither in employment nor in 
education or training on income inequality.The results have shown a positive 
relationship between the NEETs rate and the Gini coefficient in both models. An 
increase in NEETs rate by 1pp rose the level of Gini by 0.188 deviation points after 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ion Dobre, Ionuț Jianu, Alexandru Bodislav, Carmen Rădulescu, Sorin Burlacu 
__________________________________________________________________ 
72 
 
DOI: 10.24818/18423264/53.2.19.04 
 
1 year from the shock, this effect being higher the the one resulted in the case of 
extractive institutions model (0.123 deviation points). 
This indicator includes young unemployment, school dropout, as well as 
young people who do not participate in vocational training programs or those who 
have completed a higher education cycle, but do not participate in the labour 
market. Increasing the unemployment rate leads to a decrease in the income earned 
by the population and to a rise in the income gaps, given that the income from 
social benefits is lower than wages. 
Moreover, the lack of involvement in vocational training programs and the 
school dropout limits young people's ability to progress in their careers due to low 
level of knowledge or insufficient labour market experience. Early school dropout 
limits, on long-run, the rise of income for early leavers, this category of population 
being exposed usually to the risk of poverty due to lack of qualifications. 
The reason why the impact of the NEETs rate on the Gini coefficient in 
countries with inclusive institutions is higher consists in the fact that extractive 
institutions create the premises of a weak relationship between the education 
system, labour market and career opportunities , which results in a low labour 
supply elasticity of income. For example, an increase in unemployment will lead 
also to a similar growth of wages, this effect having the ability to deepen the 
income inequality. Therefore, the negative correlation in absolute terms between 
unemployment rate (a component of NEETs rate) and income level is high in 
countries with inclusive institutions.  
The impact of social spending (expressed as a share of GDP) on income 
inequality.The estimation shows that some social policy instruments (such as 
social spending) are less effective in countries with extractive institutions. In the 
case of the cluster of member states with inclusive institutions, we have 
demonstrated that an increase in social spending by 1pp of GDP leads to a drop in 
the Gini coefficient by 0,270 deviation points, a negative impact significantly 
higher than the one estimated for the group of countries with extractive institutions 
0.166 deviation points). 
Social spending is more effective in countries with inclusive institutions as 
they are conditioning social benefits on labour market participation. Other 
countries provide some financial incentives to reinforce the young people's 
motivation to participate and perform in school / student activities. However, some 
measures are losing their impact due to the structural challenges faced by the 
educational systems from the countries with extractive institutions. Moreover, 
regarding this indicator, we have also found a mentality disparity. In the Northern, 
Continental and Anglo-saxon sub-models, the population prefers to use 
unemployment benefits to identify new career opportunities for starting their 
activity on the labour market, while the population from the member states with 
extractive institutions are losing their motivation for labour market participation, 
some of them being content with these benefits. Paradoxically, although the Nordic 
countries provides high unemployment benefits, the population is oriented towards 
a participatory life, which leads to a high employment rates in these countries - a 
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good example is SE with the highest employment rate for the 20-64 age-group in 
the EU-28 (81.8% in 2017).  
The impact of the private sector credit granted by the banking sector 
on income inequality.Regarding the implications of banking activity on income 
inequality, we found that the increase of private sector credit granted by banks by 
1pp of GDP leads to the growth of Gini coefficient by 0.015 deviation points in 
member states with inclusive institutions, which is higher than the impact 
associated to the extractive institutions model (0.005 deviation points). The sign of 
the coefficient can be explained by the higher accessibility of the individuals / 
corporates earning high incomes / profits, these type of loans being less risky for 
banks. 
If the beneficiary is an economic entity, it may access funds in order 
to  establish new development strategies, which ultimately results in an increase in 
employee profits and earnings that facilitates an increase in the income gap 
between employees of that company and those of other companies that have less 
access to credit. The reason why the impact of private sector credit  proved to be 
more robust in the case of the group of countries with inclusive institutions consists 
in the fact that, in these countries, the conditions for accessing the loans are tighter 
than those in force in countries with extractive institutions. Therefore, big 
economic players or the high income population have a greater accessibility to 
loans in the countries with inclusive institutions.  
Testing hypotheses.As can be seen in Figure 3, the evolution of the 
regressors explains 98.46% of the dynamic of the Gini coefficient for the cluster of 
states with inclusive institutions. Even if, the coefficient of determination is higher 
in the extractive institutions model (99.77%), the differences are slight. This made 
it possible the validation of the proper selection of the regressors in both models. 
All coefficients are statistically significant excepting the coefficient of the 
autoregressive term associated to the inclusive institutions model that is statistically 
significant only at 10% significance threshold. Moreover, the probabilities 
associated with the Fisher test (<5%) confirmed the validity of both models. 
All tests performed checking the absence of cross-section dependence 
(excepting Breusch-Pagan LM test - the inclusive institutions model - Table 3) 
confirmed the null hypothesis. Since most tests have confirmed this assumption, 
we have accepted the hypothesis according to which there is no dependence 
between cross-sections. 
The distribution of the residuals proved to be normal since the probability 
associated to Jarque-Bera statistics is greater than 5% (21.58% - the inclusive 
institutions model, 43.25% - the extractive institutions model). Following the 
estimation of Equation 3, the results of the Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey test confirmed 
the homoskedastic character (the constant variance) of the residuals for both 
models, as the probabilities were above the 5% significance threshold. 
The probabilities associated to Breusch-Pagan serial correlation test led to 
the acceptance of the null hypothesis (there is no autocorrelation between the 
residuals) in both models. 
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Tabel 3. Assumptions checked 
Assumptions checked Test 
Inclusive institutions 
model (probability) 
Extractive institutions 
model (probability) 
Fixed effects model is 
redundant 
Redundant Fixed Effects - 
Likelihood Ratio test 
00.00% 00.00% 
Random effects model is 
appropriate 
Correlated Random 
Effects - Hausman test 
100.00% 100.00% 
Absence of cross-section 
dependence 
Breusch-Pagan LM 03.51% 07.08% 
Pesaran scaled LM 37.83% 61.75% 
Bias-corrected scaled LM 60.38% 36.04% 
Pesaran CD 87.91% 71.85% 
Normal distribution of the 
residuals 
Jarque-Bera test 21.58% 43.25% 
Absence of serial 
correlation 
Breusch-Pagan serial 
correlation test 
24.10% (n = 70, df = 1) 24.88% (n = 70, df = 1) 
Homoskedasticity 
Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey 
Heteroskedasticity test 
75.24% (n = 84, df = 5) 97.71% (n = 84, df = 5) 
Source: Own calculations using Eviews 9.0 
The validated assumptions confirmed the maximum verisimilitude of the 
estimators. Therefore, we accepted the robustness of the coefficients. 
5. Conclusions and recommendations 
The designed clusters are in line with the EU's sub-models of development, 
which highlights the link between the quality of institutions and the level of 
economic development. Based on the analysis of the statistical correlation between 
income inequality and the institutions pillar, we identified a negative correlation of 
approximately 37%, which reflects a possible negative effect of institutions on 
income inequality. 
This paper showed that inequality is more persistent in countries with 
extractive institutions, given the higher impact of historical inequality on the 
current one than the impact estimated for the extractive institutions model. Also, 
the Gini coefficient reacts higher to a change in the dynamics of the people at risk 
of poverty rate in countries with low institutions quality. Moreover, the extractive 
institutions model is weaker than the inclusive model as regards the efficiency of 
government intervention through social protection expenditure. Our estimates 
proved that the social spending is more efficient in European Union member states 
having a favorable institutional climate.  
The impact of private sector credit granted by the banking sector on the 
Gini coefficient dynamics has proved to be positive in both models. Our 
estimations demonstrated that the effect of private sector lending on inequality is 
higher in the inclusive institutions model than the one associated to the extractive 
institutions model as a consequence of the tighter lending conditions in the first 
mentioned group. 
Our paper confirmed the positive relationship between the rate of young 
people neither in employment nor in education or training (NEETs) and income 
inequality in both models. The results of the estimation indicated a higher impact 
of the NEETs rate on inequality in countries with inclusive institutions, which can 
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be explained by the stronger link between wage levels and labour supply in these 
countries. 
The issues encountered in countries with extractive institutions can be 
solved by improving government efficiency and the quality of institutions as well 
as by strengthening the role of trade unions or social partners in order to increase 
the bargaining power of them. Moreover, acts of corruption affect all sub-indices of 
the institutional pillar and its decrease may have favorable consequences on 
reducing income inequality.Identifying mechanisms to monitor and reduce the 
influence of lobby groups in the political decision-making process to obtain 
benefits and preferential treatment is a good way forward.Finally, we have 
identified an inclusive growth dashboard covering threedimensions on which the 
national governments should focus on in order to streamline the impact of 
government intervention on moderating income inequality:   
 participatory life: social benefits conditioned by labour market participation 
or educational outcomes, tight rules for corporates in order to improve the 
behaviour of firms, public-private partnerships between universities and 
economic entities, improving health systems and budgeting them depending 
on their needs, encouraging active ageing, increasing the labour market 
flexibility, promoting career opportunities for young people, strengthening 
the role of trade unions; 
 governance: improving property rights, intensifying the punishment for 
corruption, improving the efficiency of government spending, reducing the 
burden of government regulation, increasing the incidence of progressive 
tax, improving transparency, strengthening auditing and reporting standards, 
labour market institutions (minimum wage setting policies / employment 
security policies / employment protection legislation), anti-discrimination 
institutions; 
 money: low inflation, new financial instruments for small and medium 
enterprises or low income population, progressive interest rates depending 
on the income earned, adjustment funds for absorbing digital shocks; 
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